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A W T I O N  SAFETYAS A FUNCTION OF PILOT EXPERIENCE: 
MTIONALE OR RATIONALIZATION? 
Bill D. Bell, Charles L. Robertson, and Gregory S. Wagner 
Editor's Note: This arficle originally appeared in the Spring 1992 issue. It is reprinted due to its continuing value 
and timeliness. 
This study tests the effectiveness of an experience model in predicting aviation safety behavior. The 
elements comprising the model include: (a) flight hours, (b) ratings and flight characteristics, (c) career status, 
and (d) malfunction history. Data were derived from a random sample of U.S. pilots in Fall 1990 by means 
of a survey instrument. Significant variance in aviation safety is not explained by the model. The  key predictor 
of safety behavior is the career status (i.e., certificate duration) of the pilot. Flight hours, ratings, and 
malfunction history are negatively and non-significantly associated with aviation safety. The research: (a) ques- 
tions the  use of these variables in ex post facto "explanations" of aviation safety, and (b) suggests a topology 
for examining safety behavior. 
THE PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE 
Pilot experience is an ill-defined variable in avia- 
tion safety literature (Campbell, 1987; Schiff, 1985, 1987; 
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association [AOPA], 1987a- 
b). Although its definition is frequently unspecified, it 
generally refers to the accumulated wisdom attendant on 
involvement in flight activities (Kershner, 1981, 1985). 
The experienced pilot, for example, is regarded as a good 
pilot, as a safe pilot, and as an individual whose 
understandings, judgments, and actions bespeak reliable, 
conscientious behavior. 
As an explanatory variable, however, experience 
has not been generally explored from an empirical 
standpoint. For the most part, its nature, composition, 
and importance have been inferred from three sources: 
(1) the air transportation industry 
(2) public media 
(3) various accident investigation 
organizat ions  (e.g., Na t iona l  
Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 
AOPA, etc.) 
Generally speaking, air transportation employers asso- 
ciate pilot experience with specified degrees of flight 
activity (Schiff, 1985, 1987; Taneja, 1989) and, in this 
regard, they often require of employees a certain number 
of flight hours, specific ratings, and exposure to a variety 
of aircraft types. This pre-employment criteria assumes 
that one who meets these requirements will exhibit more 
knowledge of the field, make sounder safety judgments, 
and engender greater confidence in the public mind than 
less experienced pilots. In addition, it is considered that 
such individuals are more easily trained and involve fewer 
costs to the company. 
The philosophy of air transportation employers 
is echoed by the public media and numerous private, 
federal, and international agencies (Federal Aviation 
Administration [FAA], 1977, 1980a-b, 1985b-h; AOPA, 
1987a-b; International Civil Aviation Organization 
[ICAO], 1987a-f). 
Perhaps the most frequent media commentary to 
follow a major air catastrophe is the lack of flight time 
and aircraft familiarization of one or more members of 
the ill-fated crew. The same impression can be gleaned 
from examination of NTSB accident statistics (NTSB, 
1987a-g). 
These statistics, like comments from the public 
media, give the impression that flight experience is a 
matter of: (a) accumulated flight time, (b) time in type, 
and (c) the recency of flight activities (e.g., last 30 days, 
last 90 days, etc.). 
- -- 
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It should be pointed out that, with the exception 
of the air transportation argument as to the costs 
involved in pilot training, all explanations of aviation 
safety relative to pilot experience have been ex post facto 
in nature. That is, both media pronouncements and 
accident statistics have attempted to assess experience 
only after tragedies have occurred. To date, no research 
has attempted to examine contemporary safety practice 
with respect to flight (i.e., pilot) experience. 
The purpose of the present research is two-fold. 
The first is to suggest a theoretical orientation that can 
be used to address the cumulative assumptions of pilot 
experience. Of interest here is the internalization of those 
norms and values associated with safety practice, as well 
as an examination of factors that strengthen or diminish 
these orientations. The second is to examine pilot 
experience in relation to current safety practice. Ex post 
facto "explanationsN afford limited insight into the matter 
at hand. Our first point of departure concerns the extent 
to which a continuous or discontinuous pattern of 
socialization affects safety practice. 
THE SOCL4LIZATION THEORY 
AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Socialization is an interactional process whereby 
a person's behavior is modified to conform to 
expectations held by members of the group to which they 
belong or aspire (Brim, 1967; Hill, 1960). Such behavior 
includes not only the process by which the individual 
acquires the ways of persons around him or her, but also 
the process by which an adult takes on behavior 
appropriate to the expectations associated with a new 
position in a group (Hill, 1960). Socialization processes 
are especially active each time a person occupies a new 
position, as when joining a fraternity or sorority, being 
promoted in a business organization, becoming a parent, 
or being inducted into any special group (Goode, 1957). 
In essence, socialization concerns the attitudinal and 
behavioral changes that occur through learning. 
Socialization theorists suggest that the 
acquisition of ideas, beliefs, attitudes, and values is eased 
by the participatory integration of the individual into the 
group context (Ferster and Skinner, 1957; Goode, 1960; 
Kohlberg, 1963). That is, effective socialization is 
impossible under conditions where the individual is 
isolated from the system into which helshe is being 
socialized. Frequent interaction, it is argued, will lead to 
a more effective involvement of the participants in group 
life. 
Socialization is further eased when the norms 
and other expectational aspects of the group are focused 
or specific in nature (Bell, 1968). Generalized expecta- 
tions appear to require a longer interactional commit- 
ment of group members than do those which are codified 
or directive in scope. Generalized expectations often 
involve identification with specific role models (i.e., 
significant others), especially models who can be put in 
dramatic focus (Bandura, 1962, 1969; Bandura et.al., 
1963, 1967). Formalized expectations can be presented in 
an instructional format where conformity can be more 
easily assessed (Bell, 1968). 
In addition, socialization effectiveness is in- 
creased as the instructional aspects of group membership 
are intensified (Hill, 1x0).  Increased social and 
psychological commitment to the group situation as well 
as the frequency and intensity of socialization efforts 
combine to ground the individual more completely in the 
normative milieu of group life. Socialization theorists 
argue that this greater integration leads to a more 
comprehensive identification with the group per se 
(Ferster and Skinner, 1957; Kohlberg, 1969). The overall 
effect is to make the individual more susceptible to those 
social control mechanisms (i.e., positive and negative 
sanctions) that regulate normative compliance. 
Socialization, although influential in establishing 
attitudinal and behavioral predispositions, is not a unitary 
process (Merton, 1957). It functions in an environment 
of many social groups with competing allegiances. 
Accordingly, socialization should not be thought of as 
molding a person to a standard social pattern. Individuals 
are subjected to different combinations of socialization 
pressures, and they react differently to them. Consequent- 
ly, socialization processes can produce distinctive 
differences, as well as similarities, among persons. 
Finally, socialization does not stop at a certain 
age, but continues throughout life (Brim, 1967). 
Therefore, life experiences representing competing group 
involvements act to modify or condition the attitudes, 
beliefs, and values as well as behavioral patterns 
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established earlier. Socialization theorists posit that 
congruence in group experience provides reinforcement 
to many pre-established behavioral patterns (Gewirtz et 
al., 1956). Generally speaking, patterns of behavior that 
rehearse or dramatize a previously learned expectation 
aid in " f ~ n g n  this dimension in the individual's 
behavioral repertoire. 
Within the confines of aviation, continued flight 
activities may be seen as calling forth this repetitive 
dimension. Accordingly, those respondents with greater 
flight experience are expected to exhibit more consis- 
tently positive safety behavior. 
A corollary is suggested relative to the above 
hypothesis. It must be recalled that socialization is a 
group phenomenon. Within a group context, an 
individual is exposed to an interactional process whereby 
behavior is modified to conform to expectations held by 
group members. As has been suggested, increased 
integration in the group elicits a more comprehensive 
identification with group members and their normative 
expectations for behavior. It follows that in those 
instances where individuals are temporally or 
geographically separated from the group involvement, 
socialization effectiveness should be diminished. 
In the arena of modern aviation, it is possible to 
differentiate participants (i.e., pilots) by means of an 
avocation/profession dichotomy. For a significant number 
of pilots, flying is incidental to a host of other life 
activities. An avocation, as opposed to a profession, 
implies less consistent behavioral involvement. In 
addition, monetary compensation is normally characteris- 
tic of the latter rather than the former. For the avoca- 
tional pilot, flight-related activities are more personalized 
and less group oriented. The professional pilot, on the 
other hand, is not only compensated for flight, but 
performs within the context of a formal occupation. The 
professional's occupational involvement is characterized 
by considerable formality, symbolic identification (e.g., 
uniforms, ranks, professional memberships, etc.), 
institutionalized training requirements, and both formal 
and informal mechanisms of social control. From the 
standpoint of socialization theory, opportunities for 
interactive identification, behaviors specificity, and 
expectational rehearsal should be greater for the profes- 
sional pilot. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that 
professional pilots will exhibit more consistently positive 
safety behavior than will their avocational counterparts. 
In summary, then, socialization theory 
acknowledges the importance of group and interactional 
involvement in the formulation of attitudes and 
behavioral expectations. It describes the manner in which 
attitudes, beliefs, and values are internalized. It 
emphasizes those factors deemed essential to successful 
socialization. And, within the framework of the present 
research, it suggests a model by means of which 
behavioral expression may be predicted. 
THE RESPONDENT SELECTION PROCESS 
The data presented here comes from a sample of 
U.S. registered pilots polled in Fall 1990 by means of a 
survey instrument. Procedurally, the entire population of 
registered pilots in the United States was enumerated as 
710,000. lbenty thousand of the registered pilots who 
were non-residents of the 50 states were subsequently 
excluded from the model to maintain a homogenous 
flying environment. From the remaining (N=690,000) 
registered pilots with U.S. residence, a systematic 
selection procedure was used on the ZIP code ordered 
list to obtain a nationwide representative sample of 2,500. 
Survey questionnaires were mailed to selected pilots. A 
total of 959 surveys were received, constituting a return 
rate of 38.4%. No followup measures were instituted. 
The respondents ranged in age from 18 to 86 
years (the mean age was 43.3 years). Some 51.1% of the 
respondents were between 18 and 42 years old. Occupa- 
tionally, for 71.4% of the sample pilots, flying was an 
avocational and non-monetarily compensated activity. 
Among this subgrouping were farmers, service workers, 
and laborers (24.7%); clerical workers, salesmen, 
operatives, and craftsmen (35.4%); and professional, tech- 
nical, and managerial workers (39.9%). The mean 
educational level of the overall sample was 15.4 years, a 
figure well above the national average for the general 
population (Cremin, 1988). 
In addition, 96.5% of the sample were Caucasian; 
91.4% were presently employed; 78.8% owned their own 
homes; and 85.5% had learned to fly in a civilian 
environment. Finally, the median annual income was 
slightly less than $42,500. 
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MAJOR VARIABLES AND 
RESEARCH FOCUS 
Pilot Experience 
Pilot experience focuses on the continuing nature 
of socialization and recognizes the fact that ongoing life 
experiences act to modify or condition attitudes, beliefs, 
and values as well as behavior patterns established 
earlier. As Gewirtz et al. (1956) point out, congruence in 
group experience provides reinforcement to many pre- 
established behavioral patterns. Generally speaking, 
patterns of behavior that rehearse or dramatize a 
previously learned expectation (e.g., safety behavior) 
should aid in " f ~ n g "  this dimension in the individual's 
behavioral repertoire. As repetitive behavior is taken to 
reflect normative and/or expectational rehearsal, attention 
was focused on the temporal aspects of this dimension. 
For operational purposes, a panel of 10 aviation 
educators was polled to elicit those factors most 
indicative of pilot experience. The factors suggested 
included: 
(1) flight hours 
(2)  ratings and flight classifications 
(3) career status 
(4) malfunction history 
Respondents were asked to indicate their total 
flight hours in all aircraft, the number of ratings held 
with respect to all aircraft classifications, the duration of 
their pilot certificates, and an enumeration of the number 
and types of flight malfunctions experienced over their 
aviation careers. These numbers were totaled in each 
Table 1 
Preflight Preparation 
category and used as indicators of overall flight (i.e. 
pilot) experience. 
Aviation Safety 
From a conceptual standpoint, aviation safety 
was considered a set of socially conditioned attitudes, 
beliefs, and values specific to the arena of flight. These 
elements, it is argued, are internalized to varying degrees 
and behaviorally modified by a variety of social and 
experiential components. As such, it can be viewed as a 
product of the socialization process. For the purposes of 
this research, aviation safety constituted a particular 
predisposition toward eliminating human error and its 
attendant consequences in the aviation environment. 
From an operational standpoint, aviation safety 
was assessed by the extent to which the respondent 
reported compliance with five safety-related behaviors 
associated with preflight preparation. These behaviors 
included: 
(1) the performance of a thorough 
walk-around inspection 
(2) a through check of the weather 
before flight 
(3) the computation of fuel 
requirements with regard to 
appropriate reserves 
(4) the computation of takeoff and 
landing distance as well as 
runway lengths at all airports 
(5) the use of a checklist for 
interior and exterior inspections 
< Never Always > 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
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The respondent was presented a 7-item scale (see 
Table 1) with respect to each safety behavior and asked 
the extent to which they perform each item before flight. 
The scales were anchored with the bipolar responses 
"Never" and "Always." All responses were subsequently 
totaled to form a Aviation Safety Index. 
THE RESULTS OF ANALYSIS 
A standard multiple regression was performed, to 
determine the effect of pilot experience on aviation 
safety, for the Aviation Safety Index as the dependent 
variable (DV) and flight hours, ratings, career status, and 
malfunction history as independent variables. Analysis 
was performed for evaluation of assumptions, i.e. that 
Pilot Safety Behavior improves with an increase in pilot 
experience. 
Results of evaluation of assumptions led to 
transformation of the variables to reduce skewness in 
their distributions, reduce the number of outliers, and 
improve the normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity of 
residuals. Logarithmic transformations were used on the 
Aviation Safety Index (LOG-SAFE), Career Status 
(LOG-YEAR), Flight Hours (LOGFEXP), and 
Malfunction History (LOG-MALF). One independent 
variable, Flight Ratings and Classifications, was positively 
skewed without transformation and negatively skewed 
with it; hence, it was not transformed. With the use of 
a p < .001 criterion for mahalanobis distance, 10 outliers 
Table 2 
among the cases were found and subsequently excluded. 
Seven additional cases had missing data and were deleted 
from analysis. Analysis was limited to the remaining 942 
respondents. To detect the interactive effects of 
combinations of independent variables; flight hours, 
ratings, career status, and malfunction history; multiwIli- 
nearity and singularity investigations of the independent 
variables were performed and proved negative. 
Table 2 displays the correlations between the 
variables, comparing the predictors to determine which 
one is more important, using the unstandardized 
regression coefficients (B) and intercept, the standardized 
regression coefficients (fi), the semipartial 
correlations(sh), and R, Rh, and adjusted RB. R for the 
regression was not significantly different from zero, 
F(4,937)=2.21, pc.07, hence the regression exercise has 
not helped to explain the dependent variable (Aviation 
Safety Index). One regression coefficient does differ 
significantly from zero, using a 95% confidence limit 
calculation. The confidence limits for the Career Status 
(LOGYEAR) variable were -0.0321 to -0.0049. 
Only one of the independent variables 
contributed significantly to predicting the Aviation Safety 
Index, respondent's logarithmical transf0rmed"career 
status ( s h  = .008). The four independent variables in 
combination contributed a .001 in shared variability; 
however, altogether only 0.9% (0.5% adjusted) of the 
- - - -  
pc.01 * unique variability = ,008; shared variability = .001 
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variability in aviation safety scores was predicted by 
knowing scores on these four independent variables. 
Although correlations between the log of 
aviation safety and the logs of flight hours and 
malfunctions were -.035 and -.036 respectively, neither 
variable contributed significantly to regression. The same 
was true of the correlation between log of aviation safety 
and flight ratings and classifications (-.036). 
Post hoc evaluation of these correlations 
revealed none to be significantly different from zero 
[F(4,937) = 1.87, p <. 17; F(4,937) = .204, p <  .65; and 
F(4,937) = .523, p c  .47, respectively]. It seems clear that 
flight experience (i.e., hours, ratings, and malfunction 
history) contribute negligibly (both singularly and jointly) 
to variance in reported safety behavior. 
From the results presented in Table 2, it would 
appear that the research hypothesis has not been 
confirmed by the data. Safety behavior is not observed to 
be positively associated with the independent variables in 
question. On the contrary, all correlations are negative. 
Although these associations are not statistically 
significant, they relegate to rationalization the 
relationship of pilot experience with improved safety 
practice. 
Table 3, seeking to account for differences 
among pilots, shows a measure of how different the 
Safety Behavior Indices are. It provides a test of the 
avocation-profession corollary concerning group 
involvement. As hypothesized, a statistically significant 
difference is obtained between the aviation safety scores 
of avocational (i.e., non-monetarily compensated) and 
professional (i.e., monetarily compensated) pilots. Indi- 
Table 3 
Analysis of Variance of Safety Behavior Indices for 
Monetarily" and Non-Monetarilyb Compensated Pilots (N=963) 
viduals compensated for flight activities scored higher 
than did their counterparts (F=9.84, p <  .001). The 
implications for the predictive paradigm are seen in 
Tables 4 and 5. 
Table 4 represents a standard multiple regression 
of flight variables on the safety behavior of avocational 
(i.e., non-monetarily compensated) pilots. Only one of 
the independent variables contributed significantly to 
prediction of aviation safety as logarithmical transformed 
flight ratings and classifications (srii=.006). The four 
independent variables in combination contributed 
another .040 in shared variability. Altogether, 4.6% (4.0% 
adjusted) of the variability in aviation safety scores was 
predicted by knowing scores on these four independent 
variables. 
Although the correlations between log of 
aviation safety and the logs of career status and flight 
hours were -.I55 and -.I74 respectively, neither variable 
contributed significantly to regression. The same was true 
of the correlation between log of aviation safety and the 
log of malfunctions (-.160). Post hoc evaluation of these 
correlations revealed none to be significantly different 
from zero [F(4,661) = 1.47, p c.23; F(4,661)=.39, p <  .39; 
and F(4,661) =2.71, pc.10, respectively]. It seems clear 
that flight experience (i.e., hours), career status, and 
malfunction history contribute negligibly (both singularly 
and jointly) to variance in safety behavior. 
From the results presented in Table 4, it would 
again appear that the research hypothesis has not been 
confirmed by the data. Safety behavior among avoca- 
tional pilots is not observed to be positively associated 
with the independent variables in question. On the con- 
a Mean = 30.1841; Standard Deviation = 4.3828 
Mean = 29.2157; Standard Deviation = 4.3190 
Source 
Between Groups 
Wihin Groups 
Total 
JAAER, Spring 1995 Page 33 
df 
1 
- 96 1 
962 
Sum of 
Squares 
185.0385 
18079.6801 
18264.71 86 
Mean Squares 
185.0385 
18.8134 
F 
9.8355 
Level of Significance 
.0013 
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Table 4 
Standard Multiple Regression of Flight Variables on Safety Behavior of Non-Monetarily Compensated Pilots 
(N = 666) 
* pc.05 
** p<.001 
a unique variability = .006; shared variability = .040 
Variables 
LOGFMP 
LOGMALF 
RATINGS 
LOGYEAR 
Means 
Standard Devia- 
tions 
Table 5 
Standard Multiple Regression of Flight Variables on Safety Behavior of Monetarily Compensated Pilots 
(N =266) 
pc.05 
** pc.001 
a unique variability = .03l; shared variability = .007 
LOGSAFE 
(Dv) 
-.I74 
-.I60 
-.I78 
-.I55 
1.460 
.073 
Variables 
LOGFEXP 
LOGMALF 
RATINGS 
LOGYEAR 
Means 
Standard Devia- 
tions 
trary, all observed correlations are negative. In addition, flight variables on the safety behavior of professional 
these relationships fall short of statistical significance. (i.e., monetarily compensated) pilots. Only one of the 
Table 5 represents a standard multiple regression of independent variables contributed significantly to 
RATINGS 
.388 
1.749 
1.158 
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LOGFMP 
.488 
,566 
693 
2.600 
,683 
LOGSAFE 
(Dv) 
.I57 
.065 
.010 
.065 
1.474 
.070 
LOGMALF 
.455 
.366 
295 
.374 
LOGYEAR 
lntercept = 
,909 
.491 
LOGFEXP 
,478 
.I79 
.828 
3.579 
,571 
B 
- . W O  
-.0144 
-.0062* 
-.0095 
1.494 
Adjusted 
LOGMALF 
.455 
.366 
.295 
.374 
B 
-.089 
R Z =  
~2 = 
R = 
sr2 
(unique) 
.006 
.046~ 
.040 
.214** 
RATINGS 
.I66 
3.808 
2.055 
LOGYEAR 
lntercept = 
1.145 
360 
B 
.0401** 
-.0007 
-.0005 
-.0388 
1.377 
Adjusted 
0 
.327 
R2 = 
RZ = 
R = 
sr2 
(unique) 
.031 
.038~ 
.023 
.I 94* 
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prediction of aviation safety as logarithmical transformed 
the log of flight hours (srir=.031).The four independent 
variables in combination contributed another .007 in 
shared variability. Altogether, 3.8% (2.3% adjusted) of 
the variability in aviation safety scores was predicted by 
knowing scores on these four independent variables. 
Although the correlation between log of aviation 
safety and log of career status was .067, career status did 
not contribute significantly to regression. The same was 
true of the correlations with the log of malfunctions and 
ratings (.065 and .010, respectively). Post hoc evalua-tions 
of these correlations revealed neither to be signifi-cantly 
different from zero [F(4,261)= 3.38, p<.07; F(4,261) 
=.004, p<.95; and F(4,261) =.057, pe.81, respectively]. 
It seems clear that career status, flight hours, and 
malfunction history contribute negligibly (both singularly 
and jointly) to variance in safety behavior. 
From observation of Table 5, it would appear that 
only one aspect of the research hypothesis has been 
confirmed by the data. Specifically, those respondents 
indicating greater flight hours exhibited more consistently 
positive safety behavior (pe.01). Although the effects of 
career status, flight ratings, and malfunction history are 
in predicted directions, the associations are not 
statistically significant. 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
From the perspective of the present data, little 
variance in aviation safety was explained by the 
socialization model. With no exceptions, the associates 
were contrary to prediction. Most, however, were neither 
strong nor statistically significant. It would appear that 
aviation safety can not be adequately adduced from a 
knowedge of a pilot's flight hours, career status, ratings, 
or malfunction history. 
A second finding of this research was the suggestion 
of group specificity with respect to aviation safety. That 
is, when pilots were differentiated into avocational and 
professional categories, the model proved somewhat more 
useful. Safety index scores were found to be significantly 
higher for professional or monetarily-compensated pilots 
than for their avocational peers (F=9.84, pe.001). For 
the professional pilots, 3.8% of the variance in aviation 
safety was accounted for by the model. Whereas all 
model assumptions were borne out by the data, only the 
respondents' flight hours proved statistically significant. 
Career status, ratings, and malfunction history were 
positively but non-significantly associated with aviation 
safety (.07, .01, and .07, respectively). 
For avocational or non-monetarily compensated pilots, 
on the other hand, 4.6% of the variance in aviation safety 
was accounted for by the model. Whereas all variables 
were found to be negatively associated with aviation 
safety, only the pilot's ratings and classifications proved 
statistically significant. As in the case of the total sample, 
the associations between flight variables and aviation 
safety were negative. In general, it would appear that 
these elements provide insufficient rationale for safety 
behavior. 
LIMITATIONS AND RESEARCH 
SUGGESTIONS 
The present research is not without its limitations. 
The definition of aviation safety is a case in point. From 
a theoretical perspective, aviation safety encompasses 
both attitudinal and behavioral elements. That is, the 
individual's predisposition toward error avoidance 
includes not only a repertoire of situation-specific 
behaviors, but also numerous understandings (i.e., beliefs) 
and feelings about safety practice. In the present 
research, only the behavioral dimension was addressed. In 
addition, attention was limited to those behaviors 
characteristic of a specific flight situation (i.e., preflight) 
as opposed to those consistent with a complete flight 
scenario: pre-flight, flight, and post-flight. It seems clear 
that a more comprehensive test of the socialization 
model must incorporate not only a broader range of 
safety behavior, but must include cognitive and affective 
elements as well. 
Secondly, the operationalization of pilot experience 
must be expanded. In this research, pilot experience 
centered about flight activities. Subsequent research into 
pilot behavior indicates not only the multi-faceted 
character of pilot experience, but also its social- 
psychological dimensions. (Bell et al., 1991a,b,c). 
Individuals who view themselves as good pilots, for 
example, tend to be more conscientious in terms of safety 
behavior. In this regard, it is suggested that subsequent 
research address an individual's aviation-related attitudes, 
beliefs, and values as well as hours, ratings, etc., in 
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assessing pilot experience. in time. To assess changes in behavior over time, a 
Finally, the present data are associated with a cross- longitudinal format would be desirable.0 
sectional design. As such, they represent only a snapshot 
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